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Nostalgia is a fun thing.  When one thinks of the past, especially a past too far away to 
have experienced first-hand, all mistakes of the time are forgotten, details neatly 
smoothed over and all the answers to modern predicaments lay apparent.  So this 
seems to be the case when politicians and policy-makers think of 1829, Sir Robert 
Peel and his Bobbies.  ‘Policing by consent’, it was.  Friendly constables, never 
distracted by squawking radios, never speeding by in police cars, would wander 
amiably around their patch.  They would get to know everyone in their area, have 
access to all pertinent ‘intelligence’ (in modern terms) and could probably see off a 
good deal of trouble before it began.  They were trusted, respected and a perfect 
model of community engagement. 
 
Then lo, the bad times came in the form of the 20th century.  The police were a 
reactionary, distant and forceful institution.  Police constables changed their ‘patch’ as 
frequently as their radio batteries.  The public was an unknown entity to police and of 
which to be wary.  Patrolling was done from the safety of the squad car and 
‘community engagement’ largely involved getting information out of paid informants, 
themselves dubious characters.  Corruption scandals erupted on both sides of the 
Atlantic; encouraging performance targets and accountability measures, which 
deepened the bureaucratisation of the institution.  While this became a new 
management age in policing, the poor, ignored, marginalized and discarded 
communities lamented the loss of the their Bobbies; the blue sentinels that had stood 
firm and had signified to them (if not in words then in their being) that it was 6 
o’clock and all was well. 
 
Obviously, the above is an exaggeration of both scenarios.  The political reasons for 
the origin of the Bobbies and their initial remits are of continuing debate (Brogden 
1987, Styles 1987).  But what is certainly clear is that all members of the 
‘community’ did not openly embrace them (Rawlings 2001).  In addition, Peel never 
intended for his police constables to engage with the community as partners in crime 
control (Tilley 2003).  The constables were to patrol, checking doors and windows, 
and by their mere presence would deter thieves and other criminals (Emsley 2003).  
Thus this model is really a rather passive and reactive one (Manning 1997), which 
focused police attention on street crime and on the poorer sections of society for the 
origin of that crime.  However, one could be forgiven for overlooking these points, 
considering the way politicians and policy makers seem to view this period in history 
as being policing in its ‘purest’ and ideal form.   
 
While the description above of the 20th century may also be an exaggeration, there 
was indeed a ‘crisis’ of confidence in policing in the latter half (Wright 2002).  The 
police in England and Wales moved from the old foot patrol beat system to a 
motorised patrol system in the 1960s.  This enabled the officers to patrol larger 
geographical areas and provide a fast response to calls coming over their new 
personal radios. It was argued that this would improve police-community relations, 
but in fact the opposite happened (Newburn 2003).  In addition to mobility and speed, 
the police acquired other new technologies in the subsequent years: computer assisted 
dispatching, the centralised emergency telephone numbers (999 in the UK, 911 in the 
US) and other developments which, when combined with motorised patrol, resulted in 
a policing system which prioritised action and fast response to community 
engagement and service (Manning 1992, Newburn 2003). Despite the new 
technological advances, the police were still not able to exert much of an influence on 
the crime rate and were felt to be too distant from the people they served.  Minority 
ethnic people in particular can have very problematic relationships with the police, as 
they frequently come under the police gaze as objects of suspicion rather than of 
protection.  Something needed to change, and Peel, his Bobbies and nostalgia 
combined to provide a Golden Age of policing; long lost, but perhaps not irretrievable 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005).  The fact that the ‘community as partner’ was not a factor 
in Peel’s vision is quietly neglected here. 
 
Thus we now find ourselves in the age of Community Orientated Policing.  This, 
along with Neighbourhood Policing (in the UK), Intelligence-Led Policing, Zero 
Tolerance Policing and Problem Orientated Policing, make up a large proportion of 
the current police response to crime problems.  Some of these are more prevalent in 
the UK or in North America, but all will be discussed here to examine how they are 
supposed to be a better way to address crime than what went on before.  The basic 
idea is to get away from ‘reactionary’ crime control methods that deal with all 
incidents in isolation from each other (Tilley 2003, Wright 2002, although this is less 
so with Zero Tolerance Policing).  Each has a different way of going about this, but 
none, as yet, seem to be an ideal answer to the question of how best to do policing in 
the 21st century.  This chapter will be largely written from the UK perspective, 
although there is considerable overlap with policing developments happening in other 
countries as well, most notably in the US and Canada.ii
 
 
THE TRADITIONAL AND THE MANAGERIAL 
 
Before we can examine the more recent developments in policing, we should first 
have a brief look at policing in the ‘traditional’ sense and then in the age of New 
Public Management.  These set the stage for what was to come, as many police 
reformers felt that the traditional model had essentially failed and the new 
management practices kept the police too distant from those who were policed. The 
term ‘traditional’ in this sense refers to the post-war era of policing when the police 
worked in beats in motorised patrols, rather than the Peelian approach described 
earlier. 
 
A traditional approach to policing prioritises a ‘crime-fighting’ mentality in which 
crimes are usually handled independently of each other, and in a reactive (rather than 
proactive or preventative) way.  Police officers mainly patrol in cars and minor 
infractions are seen as crimes to be pursued rather than as signs of larger social 
problems that need to be addressed (Manning 1997).  Technology is highly prized as 
being essential to investigation to the extent that members of the public are often 
contacted electronically rather than in person. Investigation generally is seen as the 
epitome of police work while community activities have the lowest status. This 
enforcement approach to policing can have a limited impact on the crime rate and 
simply doing more of it (in terms of increased police budgets) does not improve this 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005, Tilley 2003).  Police culture tends to be viewed as 
orientating itself around this vision of policing (O’Neill and Singh 2007), which was 
seen as unproblematic until the 1970s and 1980s.  Communities were becoming 
increasingly socially and ethnically diverse, and the crimes that affected them had 
varying characteristics that the police were struggling to address.  Crime rates 
continued to rise, as did the cost of policing (Brogden and Nijhar 2005).  In addition 
to this now largely ineffective approach to policing, police officers themselves were 
coming under scrutiny for their behaviour (planting evidence, abuse of suspects, 
taking bribes, etc).  Several corruption scandals have occurred on both sides of the 
Atlantic in the mid to late 20th century, leading to various attempts at reform, which 
usually met with limited success. Police morale was falling, as was the confidence of 
the public in them (Wright 2002).   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s came the move towards ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ in the 
police service.  This is the dawn of the New Public Management (NPM) era in the UK 
(and similarly with COMPSTATiii in the US), which sought to reconceptualise the 
police in terms of being a service (rather than a force) that was accountable to its 
customers (rather than to clients or the ‘public’). Public services were increasingly 
managed in ways similar to that of the private sector (O’Malley 1997) where 
performance was to be measured against pre-set targets to ensure best ‘value for 
money’.  These locally set targets for policing were designed to meet nationally set 
objectives (Fielding and Innes 2006).  This has had many implications for policing 
practice, some of which will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.  While the 
move towards this kind of managerialism was intended to ensure that the police 
service performed more effectively, the types of police work that are most easily 
measured, evidenced and quantified are those that rely on traditional policing methods 
(enforcement leading to better arrest rates, clear-up rates, etc.).  Certain types of crime 
satisfy these targets better than others, known as the ‘volume crimes’ such as burglary 
or assault, and thus these tend to be prioritised.  Police methods themselves remained 
largely unchanged in this management style, while their use is now more carefully 
held to account.  The public’s role as consumers of a service who deserve to be 
satisfied that their needs are being met is essential.  However, as policing objectives 
are set at a national level, there is only a certain amount of scope for how much the 
‘community’ can influence policing in this model (Long 2003, Maguire and John 
2006).  So while the New Public Management was meant to be a great change in the 
police organisation (and in certain respects it is), it has left some of the key problems 
with policing unaddressed: enforcement-orientated methods into which the public has 
little real input are still valued.  Manning (1999) has argued that not only is it not 
possible for the police to be ‘efficient and effective’, but that it is actually not 
desirable. For example, a public service that needs to be able to respond at a 
moment’s notice to any event must have extra resources and time at the ready to 
spend on it – something that is neither efficient nor effective in terms of officers’ 
overtime and public spending. 
 
COMMUNITY ORIENTATED POLICING 
 
Community Orientated Policing (COP, also known just as ‘community policing’) is 
meant to take the involvement of the public in their police service to a new and deeper 
level than that afforded in the new management styles (although it can help to meet 
some of the NPM accountability requirements), and to encourage non-traditional 
policing practice. As Skogan and Hartnett (1998) discuss, there was a coalescence of 
factors that made community policing possible in the US from the 1970s onwards, but 
particularly in the 1990s.  Much of this was mentioned above in relation to the 
problems of the traditional approach to policing.  Minority ethnic groups had 
developed a history of conflict with the police, sometimes culminating in urban riots.  
Enterprising and aspiring senior officers who were willing to embark on new 
approaches to these communities found their career prospects enhanced.  Top police 
officers now often had university degrees in subjects that encouraged a receptiveness 
to change.  Police managers, policy makers, researchers and consultants had 
developed a robust network to communicate new ideas and share good practice across 
the country.  The general move towards a more effective, efficient and accountable 
police service was also present here along with new technologies to improve 
communication with a local public.  This ability to target police resources more 
directly towards community needs, as well as a growing willingness of police 
managers to do so, made a ripe situation from which community policing could 
emerge. 
 
Unfortunately for the purposes of this chapter, it is very difficult to find a clear 
definition of community policing.  Part of the reason for this is the nature of this type 
of policing, in that the needs of the local area are prioritised and thus any activities 
done in its name will be unique to that situation and its people.  Thus the exact way in 
which community policing is done will vary not only between police forces but also 
within them. 
 
Brogden and Nijhar (2005) offer the following as guidelines for identifying 
community policing: 
 • Neighbourhoods or small communities serve as primary foci of police 
organizations and operations. 
• Communities have unique and distinctive policing problems that 
conventional police organizations and responses have not traditionally 
addressed. 
• Community consensus and structures should guide police response to the 
community’s crime and security problems. 
• Policing should be both locally accountable and transparent. 
• Police discretion is a fact and should be used positively to maximise 
community confidence in the police. 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 23-24) 
 
The general idea then is to take policing down to a rather microscopic level of 
engagement, to be lead by these local actors in whichever way they see fit and to be 
held accountable to them.  Thus it goes against much of the methods the police used 
to do their work before or, more importantly, goes against the kind of working 
practice the police value most highly: internally-driven, crime-fighting approaches 
where offenders are pursued and captured and the community is there mainly to give 
the police any information needed to do the job (Brogden and Nijhar 2005, Skogan 
2006, O’Neill and Singh 2007).  While the police have always to some extent been 
involved in ‘social work’ types of activities, these were not regarded very highly as 
being ‘true’ police work.  The emphasis in community policing is to reverse that 
tendency, to see the ‘community’ as the main priority. 
 
Perhaps more important than a definition of community policing here is a definition 
of ‘community’.  As this concept forms the basis of all further police action, we must 
consider how exactly it is identified.  Now while that is probably a task best left to a 
different volume of academic research entirely (and has been), a few thoughts will be 
considered here.  There are different ways that the police can go about identifying and 
engaging a ‘community’, such as by using pre-existing networks or forums, 
approaching a specific geographical area to illicit its input or linking in with identity 
groupings (such as a specific religion or sexual orientation-based groups).  All of 
these ‘communities’ come with their own inherent problems, such as finding suitable 
‘leaders’, having internal fissures and competing demands, as well as difficulty in 
remaining stable for a reasonable length of time to allow work with the police to be 
successful.  Community police officers may find themselves faced with different 
accounts and demands from the same group (Hughes and Rowe 2007).  With pressure 
from above to engage with and reassure these nebulous entities, community officers 
have to do the best they can.  It may be that ‘community is not so much a descriptive 
term as a process whereby key actors (police officers, community safety managers 
and such like) construct and mobilize selectively discourses of community and aim to 
make them conducive to the aims of government’ (Hughes and Rowe 2007: 338).  
The result is that those areas that probably need more positive engagement with the 
police are least likely to do it.  These would tend to be the more deprived areas, 
accustomed to seeing the police as oppressive law enforcers, rather than as partners in 
local area development.  At the same time, those who are willing to work with the 
police are precisely those who least need it: well-organised community collations with 
comparatively less crime problems (Tilley 2003, Skogan 2006).  It would appear in 
effect that a high level of social capital (strong social networks in a community that 
bring about collective action and maintain social control) certainly helps make 
community policing easier, but areas with high social capital have less need of 
engaging with the police more than they already are. 
 
While it may be difficult to find and motivate a ‘community’ into action that does not 
mean that it cannot be done.  Many community policing initiatives have happened 
worldwide since its earliest inception in the 1970s.  While ‘Community Orientated 
Policing’ was initially and American concept, it has been exported around the globe 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005) and it even informs efforts at democratic policing in 
developing and failed nations through its concepts of community accountability and 
engagement (see Pino and Wiatrowski 2006iv).  Judging the success of COP, 
however, is another matter.  As mentioned before, activities that fall under the 
‘community policing’ label are many and varied, so each would need to be assessed 
independently.  As Tilly (2003) points out, however, this can be difficult to do as 
much of community policing is supposed to be based on police officer creativity and 
non-standardised outcomes. Supervising this kind of work, as well as monitoring it 
and judging its success can be a murky task.  A further complication is that the 
officers doing the work with communities may focus their efforts on things that can 
be easily quantified and measured (under the guise of ‘community policing’), rather 
than on the actual problem-solving itself.  Brogden and Nijhar (2005) report that 
many police forces in the US are no longer even trying to maintain a pretence of 
community policing, either changing it to ‘community problem solving’ or simply 
reverting back to traditional, crime-lead policing.  This is especially so in areas of 
great deprivation, where the   police may make gestures towards community 
engagement, but then continue to police in a more traditional way as it is far easier to 
do so (see Skogan et al 1999).  
 
Until recently in the UK, community policing was largely left out of a very powerful 
measurement of police success, Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) 
(Herrington and Millie 2006).  These are a product of the move towards New Public 
Management in the police, as discussed earlier. What is important for this section is 
the contrast between the types of policing activities measured by the BVPIs (response 
times, arrests, clear-up rates, etc) and those types of activities that are valued and 
ultimately more successful in a community-orientated approach (meeting with local 
residents, moving children away from crime hotspots, etc).  These two approaches to 
policing ‘value’ exist in parallel to each other and ultimately are in competition with 
each other for resources (although the current incarnation of BVPIs make slightly 
more of an attempt at including community elements, to be discussed later).  While 
success in a community policing approach may not actually be felt for several years as 
the changes take root and are not easily quantified, immediate and measurable 
outcomes can be gained from the more traditional policing methods (Herrington and 
Millie 2006).  And it is by success in these latter activities that police services are 
measured and ultimately praised for their ‘effectiveness’, thus inadvertently 
encouraging more orientation towards them and less towards the vague, immeasurable 
and long-term solutions afforded by community policing (Fielding and Innes 2006).  
The central UK government is in effect encouraging two competing policing 
ideologies, but reserving most of its praise (in terms of judging the ‘effectiveness and 
efficiency’ of a police force) for the one that relies upon traditional, reactionary 
policing methods.   
 Police officers themselves are aware of this tension and of the pressure upon the 
police force to adhere to both ideologies (while community policing might be being 
dropped in some forces in the US, it is still a national priority in the UK, more on this 
later). The above points to an inherent problem of community policing mentioned 
before: it largely works in conflict with traditional policing methods, culture and 
ethos.  But after more than 20 years of COP, in one form or another in the US and 
UK, can some changes be detected in the overall institution to address this?  Surely 
some efforts are being made to sell the idea to new recruits?   
 
Chappell (2007) discusses police training in the US and reports that while training in 
the academy has started to incorporate community policing elements, these are largely 
missing from new recruits’ experiences in field training.  The former is largely 
classroom based training while the latter involves the new officer out in public with a 
field training officer, a logical place to build upon the techniques learned at the 
academy.  However, as Chappell argues, the field training method used in most police 
forces (San Jose model) has been largely unchanged since its inception in the 1970s, 
despite being designed to adapt to the local priorities of the agency using it. This is 
attributed to difficulties in changing the structure and priorities of bureaucratic police 
institutions, field training officers focusing on ‘the basics’, and cultural resistance to 
community policing.  Peace (2006) analyses the initial induction period by evaluating 
how well andragogy is employed in training probationary officers in England and 
Wales and if this is successfully applied to furthering community policing skills.  
Andragogy theory stipulates that adults learn differently than children and has been 
adopted by the police service as a guiding principle for its trainers.  It can also fit very 
well with developing skills that support a community-orientated policing approach, as 
it is student-lead.  This mirrors the emphasis on police officer creativity and 
experimentation inherent in community policing.  However, Peace found that despite 
a recent overhaul of probationer training in England and Wales to encourage 
community engagement, the (at the time) proposed new methods still prioritised 
traditional policing techniques largely based around law enforcement and that 
andragogy was not largely apparent in the training approach.  Time will tell if the new 
decentralised training regime in England and Wales can meet expectations for a more 
community-savvy police service (see next section on Neighbourhood Policing).  As it 
was only implemented nationally in April 2006, it is still too early yet to assess its 
effectiveness (Rogers and Lewis 2007) 
 
If training does not yet show strong signs of changing to meet the new community 
policing ethos, what about individual performance evaluations?  This would be 
another area where the institution could adapt to the ideological goals of community 
policing, by formally assessing how well police officers demonstrate the necessary 
skills or perform relevant tasks.  Lilley and Hinduja (2006) argue that many police 
forces in the US are indeed modifying their appraisal processes to take community 
policing into account.  Traditional appraisal schemes usually measure the more easily 
quantifiable side of policing (arrest rates, number of crimes solved, number of 
complaints lodged by the public, etc.).  In this way, supervision and appraisal can be 
done at a distance, though indirect indicators, which are less resource-intensive.  This 
can mean that police officers tend to avoid certain actions that may look bad on an 
appraisal, but this is not the same as engaging in high-quality policing.  Appraisal 
schemes which do take community policing methods into account will look for ways 
in which officers employ a problem-solving approach and who do work in quality of 
life issues, rather than just use law enforcement methods.  They would also emphasise 
independent thought as well as good teamwork.  Lilley and Hinduja (2006) conducted 
a survey of over 400 police organisations in the US to ascertain if the above was 
indeed happening in officer evaluations.  The results paint a mixed picture: while 
police agencies that embrace a community policing ethos do indeed show a greater 
appreciation for innovation in their officers (such as through public speaking, 
leadership or creativity), all organisations surveyed rated this as less important than 
the more traditional factors such as avoiding trouble and following agency norms.  In 
addition, community policing agencies have not reduced their use of law 
enforcements statistics in measuring officer performance, but merely added more 
qualitative measures to the assessment process.  This would suggest that even in those 
police agencies that embrace community policing, the traditional policing methods 
and ethos have not diminished to the extent that they are devalued in the appraisal 
process. 
 
Lilley and Hinduja (2006) are unsure if the above is due to organisational resistance, 
or more to a lack of motivation on the part of administrative officers to significantly 
alter the appraisal system.  Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argue that, for whatever 
reason, few police organisations in the US have truly embraced the overall 
organisational change that community policing invites and not much other than the 
status quo is a result. This may mean that any significant changes to the police 
institution to bring it more in line with the community policing ideology (such as in 
training and appraisal) will be difficult to achieve.  Pino and Wiatrowski feel that this 
is happening in spite of dramatic organisational changes in other segments of the 
public and private sector.  Even if individual officers can overcome the usual cultural 
resistance to community policing (Chappell 2007) (such as seeing it as social work, 
middle managers fearing losing authority, conflicts with established expectations of 
police work) the organisation itself does not always change in ways to fully support 
officers in their community work (such as by providing adequate resources for it or 
valuing it in performance assessments).  To truly embrace the ethos of community 
orientated policing, the entire institution needs to change to one orientated around the 
community it serves, and so far this does not seem to be happening in the US (Skogan 
2006, Pino and Wiatrowski 2006, see also Manning 2007).  Thus a picture emerges 
where community policing is either sitting alongside the traditional model of policing 
(and is often in conflict with it), or is merely providing window-dressing for the 




As mentioned above, community orientated policing has been in practice in the UK 
for a number of years.  However, since The Police Reform Act of 2002 the central 
government has given it a new impetus, a new theoretical underpinning, as well as a 
new name.  Could this be enough to end the mere lip service often paid to COP (as 
seems to be the case in some areas of the US) to make it truly an integral part of 
policing, the ‘golden thread’ that runs throughout what the police do (Herrington and 
Millie 2006)?  This next section will explore some of the literature produced so far on 
this development. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, overall levels of recorded crime have been falling in England 
and Wales.  It was also just before and during this time that the police adopted their 
New Public Management approach to policing that put ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ 
to the fore.  The result was that volume crimes (such as burglary and theft) were 
prioritised, as they would produce the more easily measured and quantifiable results, 
thus meeting the government’s demands for a reduction in crime and an increase in 
accountability.  While this seems to have been a success in terms of the crime rate, it 
has also meant that relationships with community members were not high on the 
police priority list.  Since that time when crime rates began to fall, a new factor was 
on the increase: fear of crime.  The disparity between actual recorded crime levels and 
the perception the public had of crime is called the ‘Reassurance Gap’ (Herrington 
and Millie 2006).  This propelled the government into action and it launched the 
National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England and Walesv in April 
2003.  It ran for two years and its main objectives were to improve public confidence 
in the police while reducing the fear of crime (Fielding and Innes 2006).  Integral to 
the reassurance project was a focus on ‘signal crimes’, a perspective developed by 
Martin Innes and colleagues at the University of Surrey (see Innes and Fielding 2002). 
Signal crimes can be anything that causes a person to feel alarmed or fearful of harm 
or disorder, such as graffiti, drug dealing or fly-tipping.  The events or objects that 
become signals to a person do not necessarily bring about further or worse crimes (as 
is the premise of the ‘Broken Windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling 1982, see later 
section on zero-tolerance policing), but can bring about changes in the person’s 
behaviour to avoid harm.  Signal crimes do not necessarily signal the same kind of 
danger or disorder to all people, and thus the importance here is how events are 
interpreted and acted upon, rather than on their ability to further increase the crime 
rate in an area.  This leads to the importance of consulting with local areas to ascertain 
which events or objects are signals for them. 
 
Reassurance policing as it was developed for the NRPP had reassurance as a core 
process in police work, rather than an outcome in itself.  Reassurance was to be the 
style of policing that officers adopted, by helping local areas to address their signal 
crimes so that they felt more secure in their surroundings, more cohesive (collective 
efficacy) and had greater confidence in the police.  In this approach, overall security is 
the master concept.  This is in contrast to how a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary described reassurance (Herrington and Millie 2006).  In Povey’s 
paper (2001), reassurance is a goal in itself, and by achieving it the public could be 
encouraged to engage with the police more fully, and potentially provide more 
intelligence and other assistance in reducing crime.  By being ‘visible, accessible and 
familiar’, the police would begin a virtuous circle, whereby the more reassured the 
public felt, the more they would assist the police, the more the crime rate would 
reduce and the more the public would feel reassured (Povey 2001, cited in Herrington 
and Millie 2006).  There is thus a subtle difference in these two types of approaches to 
reassurance (in the former it is a process, in the latter it is an outcome), but only one 
could win out in the end. 
 
Towards the end of the NRPP, its five core elements were modified slightly from their 
original text to include a specific mention of tackling anti-social behaviour and a 
suggestion that tackling disorder is additional work.  These suggest a narrowing of the 
scope of reassurance policing so that it is no longer purely based on the signal crimes 
identified in local areas, and that is not a ‘golden thread’ running throughout all 
policing work, but needs specific allocation of resources of its own.  It seems as 
though national priorities were having an influence on how reassurance policing was 
to be done.  Researchers who assessed the success of the NRPP reported that the 
police officers involved did not show an awareness of the concept of reassurance as a 
policing style, instead of being a policing goal.  Their respondents often spoke of 
achieving reassurance with the public, rather than embarking on overall 
neighbourhood security (Herrington and Millie 2006).  Thus the philosophical 
underpinnings of reassurance and signal crimes were perhaps being lost to a more 
general focus on community policing as had been exercised in the past. 
 
When the NRPP came to an end, it was deemed to be a success (Tuffin et al 2006), 
but was not implemented across England and Wales in exactly the same format as it 
was in the trail programme.  What is now in place is a programme of ‘neighbourhood 
policing’.  The signal crimes perspective is still named as an integral part of the 
approach, but the core principles have changed from those identified in Herrignton 
and Millie’s (2006) work to the following: 
 
Neighbourhood Policing: 
1. Is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the 
public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime and 
disorder, improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security 
2. Is managed within mainstream policing activity, integrated with other 
policing services 
3. Requires evidence based deployment of neighbourhood teams against 
identified need 
4. Establishes dedicated identifiable, accessible and responsive 
neighbourhood policing teams which provide all citizens with a named 
point of access 
5. Reflects local conditions and is flexible and adaptive 
6. Allows the Police Service to work directly with local people to identify 
problems that are most important to them, thereby giving people direct 
influence over local policing priorities 
7. Establishes a regime for engaging other agencies and the public in problem 
solving mechanisms 
8. Uses the National Intelligence Model (NIM) as the basis for deployment.  
9. Requires an effective engagement, communication and feedback strategy, 
and a clear explanation of where accountability lies 
10. Should be subject to rigorous performance management including clear 
performance monitoring against a local plan and commitments made to 
neighbourhoods 
(Neighbourhood Policing Programme websitevi
 
) 
While there is indeed a continued emphasis on consulting local people and reflecting 
local conditions, there is also repeated mention of joint working with other partner 
agencies and working in teams.  Emphasis on evidence-based police deployment is 
clear, as is a commitment at the end to performance management and monitoring.  So 
we can see here a mixture of the original reassurance philosophy of engaging the 
public and being flexible and adaptable to their needs, but also the New Public 
Management of policing with evidence-based deployment, working with partner 
agencies to spread the load and performance management.  This ideological duality 
also reflected in the way neighbourhood policing is presented in point two as being 
part of mainstream policing activity, but in point four requires dedicated policing 
teams.  This echoes a finding in Herrington and Millie’s (2006) work in that while 
reassurance was to be the work of all police officers; it was in practice usually left to 
those with a ‘community’ role.  Nowhere in the above list is there a mention of 
‘reassurance’ in the principles of neighbourhood policing.  While the focus of 
reassurance policing was largely around an improved sense of security for 
communities and reducing the ‘Reassurance Gap’, neighbourhood policing mentions 
crime and disorder in point one as a key principle, before mentioning feelings of 
security.  It would appear that Herrington and Millie’s (2006) observation of a 
narrowing of the focus of reassurance policing towards national goals instead of a 
purely open-ended approach lead by local communities continued into the 
Neighbourhood Policing Programme.  We can also note the continued struggle to 
make community-type policing activities fit within or at least alongside the traditional 
policing model, as evidenced in the US.  Thus what is listed above needs to be seen as 
more of a ‘wish list’ than the reality of policing practice, as traditional policing 
methods do remain.  There does not seem to be here a suggestion of altering the entire 
police institution to one focused on the community first and foremost.  
 
What is perhaps unique to the Neighbourhood Policing Programme in England and 
Wales and is so far largely absent from other community policing initiatives is an 
attempt to integrate its goals into police service performance monitoring methods.  As 
mentioned above, Best Value Performance Indicators were introduced and used in the 
late 80s and early 90s to assess if the police service was achieving ‘efficiency and 
effectiveness’ as determined by nationally-set organisational goals.  A BVPI related to 
‘public reassurance and quality of life’ was proposed in 2003 (Herrington and Millie 
2006), but until then, the entire performance assessment programme was geared 
towards traditional policing goals and methods.  All the BVPIs were condensed and 
renamed ‘Statutory Performance Indicators’ in 2004 in a new Policing Performance 
and Assessment Framework (PPAF) (Flanagan 2008).  Included in the new SPIs are a 
measure of ‘public confidence’ (SPI 2) and three ‘quality of life’ measures (SPI 10a-
c).  While it is interesting to see a new recognition of reassurance-type measures, all 
of these indicators are assessed using specific elements of the British Crime Survey 
(Home Office 2006).  This is an annual national survey of the public’s experiences of 
crime, and while it is largely regarded as a very valuable tool in measuring crime 
rates, it does not quite address the more qualitative aspects of reassurance, confidence 
and fear.vii
 
 Fielding and Innes (2006) have argued for the importance of qualitative 
measures of police performance, especially those which capture the opinions of key 
informants.  These are people with a detailed knowledge of life in their community, 
especially as it has changed over time.  Fielding and Innes (2006) feel that response 
reliability is greatly improved if the people targeted are in a position to know about 
performance under neighbourhood policing.  These approaches can actually be more 
reliable than a random survey, if done well. 
As mentioned above, the core principles of neighbourhood policing include 
‘evidence-based’ deployment and employing the National Intelligence Model (NIM).  
These point to the relevance of another type of policing strategy within 
neighbourhood policing, specifically, that of ‘intelligence-led policing’. It is to this 
that we now turn, to discuss what it is and how it can co-exist with community-
orientated approaches. 
 INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
 
In the early 1990s, the police in the UK were under increasing pressure to do their 
work more ‘efficiently and effectively’, as has been discussed above.  Part of the 
response to this call came in the form of ‘intelligence-led policing’.  This is designed 
to be a more proactive approach to policing than what had taken place before.  Up 
until the 1990s, much police work was reactionary, taking each incident in isolation 
and responding to the particular crime in question.  In intelligence-led policing, it is 
the criminal who matters first, as crimes do not always happen in isolation from each 
other and criminals can work in networks.  It was theorised that by taking a more 
systematic approach, where certain people are investigated for their criminal activity, 
not only could more crimes be detected and cleared up, but also future crimes could 
be prevented.  A small number of offenders account for a large number of crimes, so 
this would be a far more efficient way to address crime.  The idea is to look at 
offending patterns and so assemble as much ‘intelligence’ as possible about certain 
offenders before police action is taken.  That way it can be targeted far more 
‘effectively and efficiently’ (Tilley 2003).  As with other police innovations, this is 
the intention behind this method. As we shall see later it may not be the reality. 
 
In order to ensure that there is consistency in the approach to intelligence-led policing 
across the UK, the National Criminal Intelligence Service developed the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers.  It 
has been rolled out to all police forces in England and Wales since April 2004 and is 
also being introduced in Scotland.  It is primarily a tool of law-enforcement, with a 
focus on criminals and their crimes and disrupting criminal networks (Tilley 2003, 
Maguire and John 2006).  There are three main levels at which the NIM works: 
 
• Level 1, covering local issues, including the while range of categories and 
levels of crime, notably volume crime 
• Level 2, covering cross-border issues, where crime issues cross 
jurisdictional borders and where intelligence needs to be shared, and 
• Level 3, covering serious and organised come operating on a national or 
international scale 
(Tilley 2003: 322) 
 
Thus all types of crime are included in the model – it is not just intended for ‘volume’ 
crime or just for organised crime.  At each level is a Tasking and Coordinating Group 
(TCG), which, using advice from intelligence units and data from analysts, allocates 
appropriate resources.  It is here that the main police ‘business’ takes place, and the 
TCG is also responsible for achieving the necessary ‘outcomes’.  The NIM is a rather 
complicated model and rather than go into great detail on how it works, I shall quote a 
helpful summary: 
 
[T]he Model splits policing into the two overarching fields of core policing 
‘business’ and its required ‘outcomes’.  The link between them is the Tasking 
and Coordinating Process.  Tasking and Coordinating operates in two 
mutually dependent modes, strategic and tactical, and is informed by four key 
‘intelligence products’.  These, in turn, are based upon nine ‘analytical 
products’ (or techniques).  The key resulting driver is the control strategy, 
which is addressed through the tactical menu (or set of operational responses). 
This general structure is replicated at three distinct Levels of policing: Level 1 
(local), Level 2 (cross border) and Level 3 (national/international). Mutual 
dependence is […] apparent, with priorities set at each level ultimately 
influencing those at the others. (Maguire and John 2006: 73). 
 
Much of the NIM is orientated around traditional, enforcement-type policing methods.  
For example, the tactical menu includes managing specific hotspots, targeting specific 
offenders or investigating a series of crimes.  It also includes, however, using 
preventative measures such as community action programmes (Tilley 2003).  
Community intelligence is acknowledged to be one type of intelligence that can be 
fed into the model, and this is obtained from the general public when they report what 
they know to the police (Maguire and John 2006).  As Hughes and Rowe (2007) have 
pointed out, community policing and intelligence-led policing used to be at odds with 
each other, in that the former was seen as a distraction from ‘real’ policing and the 
latter was seen as a more efficient and sophisticated policing method.  However, since 
the terrorist attacks in 2001, the local and the global are increasingly viewed as linked.  
Local information can have an important relevance for national and international 
events.  Thus the police are careful to ensure that all three Levels in the NIM 
influence the others, and that gains in community intelligence made through improved 
community relations with the police are fed into the NIM, wherever relevant (Hughes 
and Rowe 2007). 
 
As intelligence-led policing is closely concerned with ‘efficient’ use of police 
resources and deployment, it was easy to develop it into a management tool as well, to 
be used across the entire police organisation. Intelligence-led policing was intended to 
be applicable to all police officers and all areas of police work – not just to specialist 
units.  This means that the police work which stems from intelligence-lead policing 
does not necessarily have to be enforcement orientated, or geared towards the 
traditional policing methods.  Indeed, if intelligence generated about an area identifies 
a problem that needs to be solved, community action or partnership approaches may 
be better suited to the task.  This shows that while intelligence-lead policing was 
designed to be proactive in nature, does not have to be and in some cases should not 
be.  Thus one cannot assume the proactive police work and intelligence-led policing 
are the same thing (Maguire and John 2006).   
 
However, this distinction seems to have been lost on some officers involved in 
intelligence-led policing.  The NIM is associated with intelligence-led policing and 
therefore, by association, to proactive investigation methods, which are the preserve 
of specialist investigation units.  Instead of becoming a tool by which the entire 
organisation could do its business more effectively, it is seen as an additional method 
and an imposition.  During the time when the NIM was first introduced, reassurance 
policing had begun and it appears as though these methods initially were seen to 
conflict.  As discussed above, however, reassurance policing’s heir, neighbourhood 
policing, should be based on intelligence gathered from the community.  It can also 
provide intelligence to be fed into the NIM, so the two methods are not intended at all 
to be competitive (Maguire and John 2006).   
 
As discussed earlier, a second development in policing in the early 1990s was the 
move towards New Public Management, directed by performance indicators and 
focused on volume crimes (low-level crimes usually, such as burglary).  There is an 
important difference in philosophy between this and intelligence-led policing.  
Volume crime encourages the police to work on crimes that are likely to produce a 
good ‘result’ and clear up as many cases as possible with as few resources as possible.  
Thus prolific offenders who are more difficult to catch would not be pursued, as they 
might be in intelligence-led policing.  This suggests that volume crime is more 
concerned with quantity (and meeting performance targets) than quality in 
intelligence terms.  It also brings a return to reactive policing methods, where 
(volume) crimes are investigated independently of each other.  Efforts are being 
made, however, to link volume crime approaches to the NIM.  For example, by using 
intelligence to identify ‘crime series’, offenders can be charged with as many crimes 
as possible, as can their co-conspirators.  However, nationally set performance 
indicators do still hold a strong influence over senior police officers and research 
suggests these may at times influence how the TCG sets its priorities.  Some actions 
taken under the NIM would not show up on performance indictors and there is thus a 
risk that politics rather than intelligence could dictate policing at times (Maguire and 
John 2006). 
 
Other problems have been identified with intelligence-led policing, besides 
(perceived) conflicts with community and volume crime methods and performance 
indicators.  Generating intelligence itself can be problematic, in addition to keeping 
that flow of information coming.  Police officers are still involved in reactive 
policing, as they must respond to crimes as they are reported.  This does not always 
leave a lot of time for ‘proactive’ work.  In addition, some of the roles and activities 
that stem from intelligence-led work may be less attractive than other, more reactive, 
ones.  It is still to early to know if the NIM has been successful, but it does have a 
number of inherent barriers to overcome. (Tilley 2003).  However, Tilley argues that 
intelligence-led policing may come to sit better with the more traditionally-minded 
police officers than initiatives like neighbourhood policing.  In its most narrow 
interpretation, intelligence-led policing is primarily concerned with enforcement, 
arrest and incarceration of offenders. More fuzzy concepts such as economic 
deprivation or low social capital do not come into play, and the offender is cited as the 
main root of the problem.  The police as ‘intelligence-led’ can paint a flattering 
picture of their work, one that the public is likely to embrace.  The police are hard on 
criminals, but especially the worst and most prolific criminals.  However, as Tilley 
(2003) reminds us, this does not mean that it is necessarily a better way of dealing 
with crime.  Enforcement alone is not always the best solution (Bittner 1967), and 
there is also the ethical issue that some covert methods employed to gather 
intelligence might disproportionately impact on privacy. 
 
The NIM was designed to avoid the narrow interpretation of being intelligence-led.  It 
is in fact a business model for the entire police organisation and can include 
community input as well as that from partner agencies, and focus resources on longer-
term projects to solve community issues.  There are efforts underway in some areas to 
join up the work of Community Safety Partnerships (of which the police are one of 
many members) with that of the NIM.  Thus strategic planning could reflect the fears 
of communities, which are often focused on very low-level and isolated incidents.  At 
the moment, however, this is more of an ideal picture than the reality of police work. 
There is no guarantee that the NIM will be used to its full potential and the above 
mentioned problems and prejudices towards the NIM within the police do still exist 
(Maguire and John 2006). 
 
ZERO TOLERANCE POLICING 
 
The theme of being hard on criminals continues in the next policing method to be 
considered.  While there has been some attempt at implementing it in the UK, the US 
has shown far greater interest in zero tolerance policing.  The primary and oft-cited 
example of this comes from New York City and its dramatic fall in recorded crime, 
especially that of homicide, in the 1990s.  The mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, and the chief 
of police for the NYPD, William Bratton, had enthusiastically embraced the ‘Broken 
Windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982).  This theory stipulates that small acts 
of disorder, such as a broken window, can invite further acts of disorder if they 
remain uncorrected (more broken windows).  Increasing numbers of small acts of 
disorder will eventually lead to greater acts of disorder (graffiti, vandalism) and then 
to serious crime (drug dealing, car theft), resulting in the demise of a neighbourhood 
or other area in terms of its social control and security.  As the public grows 
increasingly fearful from the small acts of disorder, this leads them to use public areas 
less, which invites further acts of disorder and crime because informal social control 
is disappearing.  The New York policing method developed in line with this theory 
was not labelled ‘zero tolerance’ as such.  The original idea was for ‘quality of life 
policing’, but it has inextricably become known not only as zero-tolerance policing, 
but also as the epitome of this method (even though Bratton never used this term 
himself) (Newburn and Jones 2007).  Some of the main elements in the New York 
method are: 
 • Vigorous law-enforcement responses to minor crime and disorder 
• The use of civil remedies against those perceived to be involved in 
criminal activities 
• Enhanced accountability, using Compstat viii
• Public target setting in relation to crime reduction 
, of local police managers for 
crime and disorder in their areas 
• Conspicuous use of the media as a public relations tool on behalf of the 
police and policing strategies; and 
• Aggressive enforcement action against street crimes 
(Newburn and Jones 2007: 226) 
 
What lead to the label ‘zero tolerance’ being applied here was the first point – 
aggressive policing of minor incivilities such as begging, public urination or fare 
dodging.  The police ‘cracked down’ on this kind of behaviour in a way that reflected 
‘zero tolerance’ for it, in the hopes that it would prevent worse disorder or crimes 
from happening (Newburn and Jones 2007).  This, combined with the other methods 
listed above, is credited with cutting the felony rate by half and dropping the homicide 
rate from 2245 in 1990 to 767 seven years later (Dixon 1999).  It would appear on the 
surface that zero tolerance was a success, and wide widely heralded as such in the 
media at the time (Manning 2001). 
 
Dixon (1999) warns against reading too much into this, however.  First of all, there 
were significant crime rate drops in other cities in the US at the same time, which did 
not use zero tolerance policing methods.  17 of the 25 largest US cities reported a fall 
in their crime rates, as did 12 of the 17 countries in advanced industrial development.  
While it is not certain why these falls happened, what is clear is that zero tolerance 
policing was not the main cause.  Secondly, as the list of elements making up ‘quality 
of life’ policing indicates above, the police in New York were not just using new zero 
tolerance methods.  Many other techniques had been implemented.  Officers in the 
NVPD were suffering from an uncertainty in the extent to which they should use their 
powers for minor offences prior to Bratton’s arrival as chief of police due to fears of 
corruption allegations, breaches of freedom of speech and inadequate supervision.  It 
can be argued that all these changes in policing contributed to an improvement in 
morale and to an overall reform in terms of laziness, corruption and incompetence in 
some areas.  This newfound motivation for police officers to do their job may also 
play a part in the dramatic change in crime in New York (Dixon 1999). 
 
Besides the above reasons for not attributing too much credit to the New York 
interpretation of zero tolerance policing, there is another important drawback to the 
method.  ‘Crack down’ policing methods have been used before, and are not always 
received well by the community in question.  The UK experienced widespread 
disorder in 1980-81, which was sparked by an intensive programme of stop and 
search by the Metropolitan Police in a predominately black area of London.  The US 
experienced similar problems in the 1960s after a period of intensive policing.  Even 
if disorder does not arise, intensive policing methods can have a very detrimental 
effect on relationships between the police and the communities they serve if these 
methods are unwelcome (Dixon 1999).  This runs counter to the ethos of both 
community policing and intelligence-led policing where the public is a partner and 
key informant for the police (Taylor 2006). 
 It is to a fuller examination of the relationship between zero tolerance policing and 
community policing that we will now turn.  The ‘Broken Windows’ theory was 
pitched as a type of community policing.  By targeting nuisances and disorder that 
disrupt the ‘quality of life’ of residents, the police could help improve community life, 
social order and the local environment.  This would enable crime control and social 
problem resolution to be achieved through the same policing method (Brogden and 
Nijhar 2005).  However, zero tolerance is ultimately a law-enforcement approach to 
policing that usually takes an inflexible view of low-level disorder and incivilities.  It 
is an aggressive policing method done in the name, but not in the spirit of, community 
policing.  If we look at the New York experience in particular, it primarily involved 
new policing tactics, strategy and technology and not a great deal of community 
consolation or partnership working (Dixon 1999).  If we also consider the negative 
repercussions zero tolerance policing can have on police-community relations, it is 
hard to see how this could ever be interpreted as a type of community policing. 
 
Despite these problems with zero tolerance policing, it can be an attractive concept for 
police managers.  It can be a method for meeting some performance targets and 
indicators in a very dramatic and direct way.  As we have seen in earlier discussions, 
demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness is an ongoing pressure for police 
managers, and one they are highly motivated to meet.  It may come as a surprise then 
that there have been very few attempts to implement zero tolerance policing in the 
UK.  One attempt took place in the King’s Cross area in London in 1996 where the 
police took a harsh approach to both minor and major infractions of the law and 
incivilities for a six week period.  The idea was to ‘clean up’ the area.  A second 
attempt at zero tolerance policing occurred in Hartlepool at around the same time.  
Detective Superintendent Ray Mallon wanted to protect the ‘decent’ and ‘respectable’ 
citizens, and so advocated an aggressive response to any low-level nuisances 
(Newburn and Jones 2007: 227).  Other than these, zero tolerance policing has not 
been seriously implemented in any UK police force.  The lure of the ‘New York 
miracle’ can be strong, but it is important to remember that New York is not 
indicative of the rest of the world.  First of all, when zero tolerance was implemented 
in New York the population was not only highly criminalized, it was also highly 
armed.  Therefore, taking police action against a person for a minor infraction had a 
good chance of revealing some more major ones (such as an illegal firearm).  This 
will not be the case in all countries.  New York also had a staggering homicide rate, 
which is also not the case elsewhere.  As was mentioned above, the police in New 
York prior to the introduction of zero tolerance felt impeded by laws regarding 
personal freedoms and civil liberties.  Police officers in other countries have more 
power to stop and search members of the public than this, and so do not feel restricted 
in their street policing in quite the same way (Dixon 1999).  Thus zero tolerance 
policing has to be understood in the context in which it developed – the US, and New 
York in particular – and therefore it cannot be viewed as a magic fix for all policing 
problems. 
 
What has proven to be a useful aspect of the ‘zero tolerance’ era is the language it 
uses.  While the zero tolerance policing policies themselves did not transfer well to 
the UK, the terminology and the symbolism they employ did.  Prior to their election 
in 1997, the Labour Party made use of ‘zero tolerance’ in reference to their approach 
towards failing educational standards and performance.  Zero tolerance also surfaced 
in a general way to paint New Labour as ‘tough on crime’, especially when discussing 
their policies on anti-social behaviour in the 1997 manifesto.  It has also been used in 
reference to handling abuse of public sector workers and discipline in schools.  The 
fact that it can be used in so many policy arenas shows the flexibility of the concept, 
as well as its simplicity and vagueness.  It is appealing because it touches on 
contemporary concerns with disorder and lawlessness.  But as any police officer could 
attest, ‘zero tolerance’ in its truest form is impossible.  There is no practical way to 
police every single infraction that occurs in an area or institution.  Nor is this 
desirable.  Therefore, the terminology appeals more to politicians than to police 
officers and is very significant for its symbolic value.  It conveys a ‘mood’, or policy 
narrative, rather than a realistic operational plan.  It is more a form of expressive 
crime control, rather than effective crime control.  Its power is in the image it conveys, 
rather than any actual police action (Newburn and Jones 2007). 
 
PROBLEM ORIENTATED POLICING 
 
One final policing method will be discussed, and this also touches on the issues of 
police effectiveness and efficiency.  Like many of the others discussed so far in this 
chapter, it was an outcome of the call for an end to reactive policing that treated all 
incidents in isolation from each other. Problem orientated policing (POP) is often 
assumed to be the same as community orientated policing, but they are different in 
significant ways. 
 
The main underlying principle in problem orientated policing is to look for the root 
cause of problems in an area that result in multiple calls to the police.  If the source of 
the problems was addressed, then there would be an overall reduction or end to calls 
for police services.  These calls can seem unrelated to each other, but may all stem 
from the same basic issue.  For example, if an apartment complex is experiencing 
physical and social deterioration, multiple incidents may result such as burglary, 
vandalism, anti-social behaviour of residents, maybe even drug dealing.  If the police 
stop reacting to each incident in turn and instead work with local residents and the 
building’s owner/manager to improve the conditions, then all the seemingly unrelated 
incidents might end.  This makes for a more efficient use of police time and resources 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005).  There has been a increasing sense in recent years that the 
demands on the police far exceed their resources, and problem orientated policing is 
seen as one way to address this (Tilley 2003). 
 
The key difference here between problem orientated policing and community policing 
is that the former focuses on the problem to be solved, while the latter focuses on the 
means.  POP takes each situation in isolation and uses a range of options for solving 
the identified problems.  Community policing is instead a force-wide agenda that (in 
theory) is the preserve of all officers and often employs the same kinds of approaches 
to all situations (such as public meetings).  The community must be consulted and the 
police are to be lead by their concerns.  Thus the process by which problems in an 
area are identified and solved through community policing is vital as it can improve 
police community relations and give residents a greater sense of security.  This is as 
much the goal of community policing as addressing the specific community concerns 
is.  In POP, the police may or may not consult or involve local residents in the 
problem identification and resolution (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). 
 
Herman Goldstein was the main architect of problem orientated policing in the US, 
who felt that the traditional model of policing had serious shortcomings.  He stressed 
the need for police officers to use their discretion and imagination, as well as 
community resources and data analysis to arrive at more effective ways of engaging 
police resources.  Goldstein argued that the police had become more concerned with 
procedure and had lost sight of what policing was meant to be about.  He describes 
the purposes of policing as being: 
 
1. Prevent and control conduct threatening life and property 
2. Aid crime victims and protect people in danger of physical harm 
3. Protect constitutional guarantees 
4. Facilitate the movement of people and vehicles 
5. Assist those who cannot care for themselves 
6. Resolve conflict between individuals, between groups of between citizen 
and their government 
7. Identify problems that may become more serious for individuals, the 
police of the government; and 
8. Create and maintain a feeling of security in the community 
(Tilley 2003: 318) 
 
Goldstein argues for a systematic approach to policing to achieve these aims whereby 
relevant problems in a community are researched and understood and responses 
targeted according to this analysis.  Enforcement is only one method that can be 
chosen, and often does not prove effective in the long-term as a way of solving 
community problems.  Of course, identifying a ‘problem’ is a key part of the process, 
and Goldstein felt that these would have patterns to them, which can vary widely.  
They can involve repeat offenders, repeat victims, repeat locations, high-demand 
products or even have a particular seasonality (which can be anything from time of 
day to time of year when problems are more likely to occur) (Tilley 2003).  Each 
problem needs to be understood on its own merits and solutions chosen that are the 
most appropriate to each one. 
 
Policing ‘tools’ have been developed to make the various stages in the problem 
orientated policing approach more systematic and accessible.  The main ones are the 
Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the SARA process, which stands for Scanning, 
Analysis, Response and Assessment.  PAT is used to identify a problem, and SARA 
covers the entire problem orientated process.  In PAT, the ‘crime triangle’ is 
comprised of an offender, a victim and a location (or related variations such as a class 
of victim or source of complaint).  These three features of a problem are analysed to 
detect where a change might be made in one of them so as to solve the problem.  In 
SARA, ‘scanning’ identifies a problem; ‘analysis’ brings about a deeper 
understanding of the problem (which may involve the use of PAT), which informs the 
subsequent ‘response’.  The whole process is then ‘assessed’ for its effectiveness.  
The steps in SARA are not always as clear-cut as this, but it provides the police a 
general framework in which to work   (Tilley 2003). 
 
While problem orientated policing has been embraced in both the US and the UK, 
there have been some difficulties in its implementation.  It shares with community 
orientated policing the perception that it is not ‘real’ policing, as enforcement is not a 
preferred method in POP.  Because of the cultural value placed on traditional, 
enforcement type methods, the data police gather about crime incidents tend to have 
this in mind and are not geared towards an analysis of longer-term crime trends 
(Tilley 2003, Cordner and Perkins Biebel 2005).  Thus the data itself can be 
problematic.  This then makes the subsequent analysis difficult, which is an important 
part of the SARA process.  Like the other policing methods above, problem orientated 
policing suffers from external pressures to meet performance targets, which often 
work against the philosophy of POP.  For example, as enforcement is not always an 
ideal way to address an identified problem, there will be no subsequent arrest or crime 
‘cleared up’.  This leaves vital performance targets unmet.  Police also report having 
little time to do problem-orientated work as they are still an emergency service and 
have to respond to calls when they come in (but this of course was one of the reasons 
for developing POP in the first place).  A final obstacle to implementing problem 
orientated policing is the fact that it requires a serious change to the way the police 
operate, a change that takes commitment and resources which cannot happen 
overnight.  If there is no concerted effort within a force to bring in a problem-
orientated approach, it will not achieve significant results (Tilley 2003).  Cordner and 
Perkins Biebel (2005) found in their research in San Diego that police officers tended 
towards small-scale ‘problem solving’ (favouring enforcement methods) instead of 
towards the intended comprehensive ‘problem orientated policing’, as the distinction 
had not been made entirely clear to them (see also Braga and Weisburd 2006). 
 
While problem orientated policing does experience many barriers within the police 
service, the competing policing philosophies described in this chapter are not 
necessarily one of them.  As Lancashire Constabulary has demonstrated, the POP 
process they had been promoting could be successfully linked into the National 
Intelligence Model.  Both stress the importance of gathering data about an issue or 
problem (over a comparatively long term) to better understand it and locate the best 
solution (Maguire and John 2006).  As was mentioned above, problem orientated 
policing is often confused with community orientated policing as they can involve 
similar methods (but do not always do so). Zero tolerance policing, however, will not 





This chapter has considered some of the recent innovations in policing methods in the 
UK and the US, most of which are designed to direct the police away from traditional, 
enforcement orientated approaches.  The most established and influential is 
community orientated policing (COP).  It has been employed in various forms, not 
only in these two countries, but across the globe (Brogden and Nijhar 2005) since its 
first inception in the 1970s.  The other policing methods examined here all bear some 
relation to COP.  Neighbourhood policing is currently the driving force of policing in 
England and Wales, and represents a very systematic and heavily resourced approach 
to police reform (in contrast to the patchy and sometimes under-resourced COP in the 
US).  This method not only involves police officers, but also the new breed of 
Community Support Officers (CSOs) hired and trained specifically to work alongside 
the police in the community.  CSOs are a response to the eternal call for more 
‘Bobbies on the beat’, albeit with less power and authority than a fully trained police 
officer (and considerably cheaper).  Police officers, CSOs, and other actors from local 
authority agencies all form part of a Neighbourhood Policing Team, which as of 2008 
should be present in every ‘neighbourhood’ of every police force in England and 
Wales.  Time will tell of the significance and effectiveness of this endeavour. 
 
Intelligence led policing, while still being rather enforcement-orientated, can support 
community policing methods in providing ‘evidence’ on which action can be taken.  
‘Community intelligence’, in turn, is one of many kinds of information on which this 
method relies for combating other kinds of crime.  Problem orientated policing also 
relies on effective data gathering, and is usually community-focused and sees 
enforcement as only one option among many.  However, direct engagement with a 
community experiencing a ‘problem’ is only initiated if it is deemed relevant to 
solving that problem.  Thus these two methods can be complementary to community 
and neighbourhood policing, but this is not always the case.  Zero tolerance policing 
was initially viewed as a type of community policing, in that addressing small signs of 
disorder or crime in a neighbourhood would ultimately lead to a better quality of life 
for the local residents.  In practice, this method has tended to be heavily reactionary 
and enforcement driven, and actually risks doing damage to police relations with a 
community, rather than improving them. 
 
While police officers themselves have, or are encouraged to have, a great deal of 
discretion in how they undertake these policing methods, the biggest influence on the 
manner in which these methods are enacted and ultimately on their success would 
seem to be performance indicators and management systems (New Public 
Management in the UK).  At every turn we have seen how the philosophies and 
theories behind these policing systems have been undermined (or at best influenced 
by) centrally set performance targets.  In some cases this is not necessarily 
problematic – zero tolerance policing is only marginally a community orientated 
approach and acts very much in the short-term (although not exclusively).  But for 
other systems, orientating one’s work towards nationally set priorities is in direct 
conflict with the underlying ethos of the policing method.  Several authors mentioned 
in this chapter have questioned the wisdom of trying to fit these types of systems 
within a policing service so heavily monitored by targets.  Measures are currently 
being taken in England and Wales to modify the targets so that some of them cover 
community methods, but it seems these will still to be in the minority.  Traditional 
policing methods offer the best way to meet the majority of performance indicators. 
 
There is another inherent contradiction in this situation.  While, as mentioned above, 
police officer discretion and creativity is central to many of these policing methods, 
the methods themselves were imposed from above and usually with very little 
consultation with the staff who would be enacting them.  Many new approaches to 
policing have been introduced in a rather short time frame, and it is not surprising that 
there has been resistance to them from police officers.  Research has shown that the 
police as a whole and as individuals fare better if they have been involved in some 
way in the decision-making process for the organisation (Sklansky 2007).  Not only 
do they seem to be happier workers, but the force has increased productivity and less 
citizen complaints.  Wood and Marks (2007) have conducted research into ‘bottom 
up’ reform in the police and show very positive and promising results. 
 
While the intention behind many of these new policing methods was admirable 
(moving towards proactive and/or citizen-led policing), it would seem that their 
implementation has some serious problems: multiple and overlapping methods, 
imposed form above and in conflict with powerful performance targets.  While no one 
method has emerged as the best way forward (nor can any of them claim to have been 
successfully implemented as yet), it would seem that most of them can work together 
if the effort is made to do so.  It would also seem that engaging police officers directly 
in the strategic decision-making would support and encourage them in their 
operational decision-making as well.  All of this requires a comprehensive and 
dramatic commitment to change from the police organisation and central government, 




Braga, A.A. and Weisburd, D. (2006) ‘Problem-orientated policing: the disconnect 
between principles and practice’, in D. Weisburd and A.A. Braga (eds) Police 
Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Brogden, M. (1987) ‘The emergence of the police: the colonial dimension’, British 
Journal of Criminology, 27(1): 4-14. 
 
Brogden, M. and Nijhar, P. (2005) Community Policing: National and International 
Models and Approaches. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Bittner, E. (1967) ‘The police on skid-row: A study of peace keeping’, American 
Sociological Review, 32(5): 699-715. 
 
Chappell, A. T. (2007) ‘Community policing: is field training the missing link?’, 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management: 30(3): 498-
517. 
 
Cordner, G. and Perkins Biebel, E. (2005) ‘Problem-Orientated Policing in practice’, 
Criminology and Public Policy 4(2): 155-180. 
 
Dixon, D. (1999) ‘Beyond zero tolerance’, Paper presented at the 3rd National 
Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, Mapping the Boundaries of Australia’s 
Criminal Justice System, convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology and 
held in Canberra, 22-23 March 1999. Reprinted in T. Newburn (2005) Policing: Key 
Readings. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Emsley, C. (2003) ‘The birth and development of the police’, in T. Newburn (ed.) 
Handbook of Policing. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Fielding, N. and Innes, M. (2006) ‘Reassurance policing, community policing and 
measuring police performance’, Policing and Society, 16(2): 127-145. 
 
Flanagan, R. (2008) The Independent Review of Policing: Final Report. London: 
Home Office. URL: http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-
reform/Review_of_policing_final_report/flanagan-final-report?view=Binary 
 
Herrington, V. and Millie, A. (2006) ‘Applying reassurance policing: is it “business as 
usual”?’, Policing and Society, 16(2): 146-163. 
 Home Office (2006) Guidance on Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing, 
2006/07, Version 2.0.  Home Office: Police Standards Unit. 
 
Hughes, G. and Rowe, M. (2007) ‘Neighbourhood policing and community safety: 
researching the instabilities of the local governance of crime, disorder and security in 
contemporary UK’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 7(4): 317-346. 
 
Innes, M. and Fielding, N. (2002) 'From community to communicative policing: 
'Signal Crimes' and the problem of public reassurance ‘ Sociological Research Online, 
www.socresonline.org.uk/7/2/innes.html. 
 
Lilley, D. and Hinduja, S. (2006) ‘Officer evaluation in the community policing 
context’, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 
29(1): 19-37. 
 
Long, M. (2003) ‘Leadership and performance management’, in T. Newburn (ed.) 
Handbook of Policing. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Maguire, M. and John, T. (2006) ‘Intelligence lead policing, managerialism and 
community engagement: competing priorities and the role of the National Intelligence 
Model in the UK’, Policing and Society, 16(1): 67-85. 
 
Manning, P.K. (1992) ‘Technological dramas and the police: statement and 
counterstatement in organizational analysis’, Criminology 30(3): 327-346.  
 Manning, P.K. (1997) Police Work The Social Organization of Policing. (2nd ed.) 
Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. 
 
Manning, P.K. (1999) ‘Part Two’, in B. Forst and P.K. Manning, The Privitization of 
Policing: Two Views. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Manning, P.K. (2001) ‘Theorizing policing: the drama and the myth of crime control 
in the NYPD’, Theoretical Cirminology 5(3): 315-344. 
 
Manning, P.K. (2007) ‘A Dialectic of Organizational and Occupational Culture’, in 
The Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions, M. O’Neill, M. 
Marks and A-M. Singh (eds.). Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
 
Moore, M. H. (2003) ‘Sizing up Compstat: an important administrative innovation in 
policing’, Criminology and Public Policy, 2(3): 469-494. 
 
Newburn, T. (2003) ‘Policing since 1945’, in T. Newburn (ed.) Handbook of Policing. 
Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Newburn, T. and Jones, T. (2007) ‘Symbolizing crime control: reflections on zero 
tolerance’, Theoretical Criminology, 11(2): 221–243. 
 
O’Malley, P. (1991) ‘Policing, politics and postmodernity’, Social and Legal Studies 
6(3): 363-381. 
 O’Neill, M. and Singh, A-M. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in The Police Occupational 
Culture: New Debates and Directions, M. O’Neill, M. Marks and A-M. Singh (eds.). 
Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
 
Peace, R. J. (2006) ‘Probationer training for neighborhood policing in England and 
Wales: fit for purpose?’ Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, 29(2): 335-346. 
 
Pino, N. and Wiatrowski, M. D. (2006) Democratic Policing in Transitional and 
Developing Countries. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Povey, K. (2001) Open All Hours: A Thematic Inspection Report on the Role of 
Police Visibility and Accessibility in Public Reassurance, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (HMIC), London. 
 
Rawlings, P. (2001) Policing: A Short History. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Rogers, C. and Lewis, R. (2007) Introduction to Police Work. Devon: Willan 
Publishing. 
 
Sklansky, D. (2007) ‘Seeing blue: Police reform, occupational culture and cognitive 
burn-in’, in M. O’Neill, M. Marks and A-M. Singh (eds) Police Occupational 
Culture: New Debates and Directions. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
 
Skogan, W.G. (2006) ‘The promise of community policing’, in D. Weisburd and A.A. 
Braga (eds) Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Skogan, W. G., and Hartnett, S. (1998) Community Policing, Chicago Style. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Skogan W. G., Harnett, S., Comey, J., Dubois, J., Kaiser, M. and Lovig, J. (1999) On 
the Beat: Police and Community Problem Solving. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Styles, J. (1987) ‘The emergence of the police’, British Journal of Criminology, 
27(1): 15-22. 
 
Taylor, R.B. (2006) ‘Incivilities reduction policing, zero tolerance, and the retreat 
from coproduction: weak foundations and strong pressures’, in D. Weisburd and A.A. 
Braga (eds) Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Tilley, N. (2003) ‘Community policing, problem-orientated policing and intelligence-
led policing’, in T. Newburn (ed.) Handbook of Policing. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Tuffin, R, Morris, J. and Poole, A. (2006) ‘An evaluation of the impact of the 
National Reassurance Policing Programme’, Home Office Research Study 296. Home 
Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate. 
 
Wilson, J.Q. and G. Kelling (1982) ‘Broken Windows’, Atlantic Monthly March: 29–
38. 
 
Wood, J. and Marks, M. (2007) ‘Cultural change through “Nexus” policing’, in M. 
O’Neill, M. Marks and A-M. Singh (eds) Police Occupational Culture: New Debates 
and Directions. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
 
Wright, A. (2002) Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice. Devon: 
Willan. 
 
                                                 
i I would like to express my sincere thanks to Peter Manning and Anne-Marie Singh for their helpful 
comments on a previous draft of this chapter. 
ii This is not meant to encourage the assumption that policing experiences in North America and the 
UK are largely same, nor that these systems are always appropriate for adoption by other cultures.  
Please see Brogden and Nijhar (2005) and Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) for more on the perils of 
ethnocentrism in police studies. 
iii COMPSTAT is a police administrative software package in use in the US.  It is linked to the success 
of zero tolerance policing in New York in the 1990s.  See later section in this chapter on zero tolerance 
and Moore (2003) for more. 
iv Democratic Policing, however, goes beyond the concepts of community policing to place issues of 
Human Rights and equity to the fore. 
v Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own separate policing arrangements and as yet no centrally 
organised community-type policing programmes as those to be described for England and Wales. 
vi Neighbourhood Policing Website, Accessed 20 June 2008, 
http://www.neighbourhoodpolicing.co.uk/publication.asp 
vii The PPAF system is soon to be replaced with the Assessment of Policing and 
Community Safety (APACS). This will measure the performance of all the public sector agencies 
involved in community safety under one system and is hoped to include more qualitative measures, a 
lack of which is a criticism of the PPAF (Flanagan 2008). 
viii COMPSTAT is a computerised system in the US that gathers data on calls for police service and 
levels of police activity.   This can be taken down to the precinct level and can be made available 
within about a week of the data being collected.   It is used as a management tool as well to determine 
where the police are and perhaps should be focusing their resources (Moore 2003). 
